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with a code to communicate with the presumed
spirit responsible for the sounds. The matter was
investigated and a committee determined that the
house was haunted by the spirit of Charles B. Ros-
na, a peddler who had been murdered by a pre-
vious occupant and buried in the basement. New
York State Supreme Court Justice John Worth
Edmonds was one of the converts. Initially, he set
out to debunk the Fox sisters but since he found
no device for making the rapping sounds, he con-
cluded that they indeed came from spirits.4 Soon,
he was even more convinced as the ghost of Sir
Francis Bacon, Edmonds’ intellectual hero, began
communicating with him. The possibility of com-
munication with spirits having been officially con-
firmed, spiritist table séances became popular in
both the United States and Europe, despite war-
nings by skeptics, such as Michael Faraday who
concluded as early as 1853 that the tilting of the
table was not caused by spirits but the participants
sitting around the table.
Even many scientists were convinced by the
mediums. In 1890, for example, the notorious
physician and criminologist, Cesare Lombroso
called the world’s attention to Eusepia Palladino.
Initially Lombroso assumed she was just a medical
hysteric, but in the very first séance in Naples he
heard hard raps and ringing bells, he felt phantas-
mal fingers stroking his face, and he saw the table
rise up in the air even as he held firmly onto the
medium’s hands. Lombroso conceded: ”I am be-
wildered and regretful that I opposed so persis-
tently the possibility of the facts known as ’spiri-
tist‘; I say ’fact‘ because I am still opposed to the
theory.“5 Ultimately in 1908, however, Palladino
was exposed as a fraud. She made her custom-
made table (a table that weighed less than five ki-
los) ”levitate“ simply by her hands and feet.6 Here,
the medium was the message. 
Tischordnung
No matter which force was moving Palladino’s
table, Arendt’s comparison of a modern city with
the séance merits closer examination. This propo-
sition is part of Arendt’s argument that human
actions and the space in which they occur mutu-
ally determine each other. She writes: ”Things and
men form the environment for each of man’s acti-
vities, which would be pointless without such a
location; yet this environment, the world into
which we are born, would not exist without the
human activity which produced it, as in the case of
fabricated things; which takes care of it, as in the
case of cultivated land; or which established it
through organization, as in the case of the body
politic.“7 The table is a human artefact that not
only provides a level surface upon which things
can be placed but as a cultural object it also defi-
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In the Human Condition, Hannah Arendt presents a
theory of political action as speech or discussion
between equals who are free from the biological
necessities of survival and free from being ruled or
ruling over others.1 Action is for her the highest
human activity as well as the source of meaning
and value. One of the conditions for action is the
existence of public space, such as the agora in an-
cient Athens where the work of architecture func-
tioned as a medium for speech and politics. Today,
according to Arendt, public space as a structuring
”in-between“ is disappearing and with it, the very
possibility of political action. 
In what follows, I will look at medium, media,
mediums and so on in order to make some sense
of Arendt, and speculate a bit on whether space
could function as a social substance, whether new
media might replace architecture as the stage for
political action, and whether the rhetoric of many
architecture theorists on the disappearance of spa-
ce merely involves the repetition of a few meta-
phors. 
I begin with a brilliant and obscure statement
from the Human Condition: ”What makes mass so-
ciety so difficult to bear is not the number of
people involved, or at least not primarily, but the
fact that the world between them has lost its
power to gather them together, to relate and to
separate them. The weirdness of this situation re-
sembles a spiritualist séance where a number of
people gathered around a table might suddenly,
through some magic trick, see the table vanish
from their midst, so that two persons sitting oppo-
site each other were no longer separated but also
would be entirely unrelated to each other by any-
thing tangible.“2
Arendt’s claim that modernity dissolves tradi-
tional structures was no longer new in 1958 when
the Human Condition was published. Perhaps the
most famous expression of this view of modernity
was the Communist Manifesto of 1848 with its im-
mortal dictum: ”All fixed, fast-frozen relations,
with their train of ancient and venerable prejudi-
ces and opinions are swept away, all new-formed
ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is pro-
faned, and man is at last compelled to face with
sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his re-
lations with his kind.“3 The oddly anachronistic
spiritist simile used by Arendt, however, is original.
Yet, it also harks back to the same revolutionary
year: 1848 marked the beginning of both Marxist
materialism and modern spiritualism, both of which
announced the dissolution of the traditional world.
On March 31 of that year, the house of the Fox
family in the hamlet of Hydesville some thirty
miles north of Rochester, New York, was disturbed
by inexplicable rapping noises. Soon, the young
daughters, Catherine and Margaretta Fox came up
nes social roles in a communicative situation, such
as dinner. Indeed, the height, size, shape and ge-
neral design of the table depends on the kind of
social situation that it is intended to serve. In this
sense, one cannot separate the thing or the space
from the human activity.8
It is even possible to compare the séance table
to the fabric of a traditional city. As Aldo Rossi ar-
gued, urban monuments represent tradition and
continuity, embodying the collective memory of
the community. Arendt makes a similar point,
stressing the permanence of the world of things
that forms the basis of political communication
and guarantees supraindividual immortality. Like-
wise, the séance table mediates not only between
the people sitting around it, but rather more im-
portantly, between the people and the spirits of
the dead, the previous generations. Even though
Arendt seems to think that the levitating table
would represent confusion, chaos and failure, pre-
cisely the opposite may be the case. The partici-
pants of a séance usually come to see the table
move and feel a sense of community in witnessing
what they believe to be a special moment.
Arendt draws peculiar conclusions from her
séance table example because she seems not to
distinguish between dinner and séance as social
events. And yet, the same physical table would
constitute very different social relationships if it
were used for a dinner or for a séance. This is a
good example of Arendt’s claim that activity chan-
ges the space as much as space changes activity. 
What the séance simile suggests in this reading
is that any change in the physical organizing struc-
tures of a community, in particular structures of
communication, does not so much dissolve the so-
cial world as it reorganizes a different community
and exposes the artificiality or constructedness of
all social relations and the contingent nature of
that which is being organized. What Arendt calls
an ”in-between“ is a communicative structure that
by definition sets up a situation involving two or
more separate and yet linked parties, and exclu-
ding many others. In this situation, it is impossible
to ask for a more fundamental criterion of truth or
validity. Arendt herself quotes Aristotle to the ef-
fect that ”what appears to all, this we call Being.“9
Should not that which appears to the participants
of a séance then also merit the name of reality?
Technology and spiritualism
The dancing table was not the only means by which
mediums claimed to communicate with the spirits
of the dead. As with the originary ”Rochester Rap-
pings“, the principal means of communicating with
the dead was through sequences of knocks which
were interpreted by the medium as an alphabetic
code. The parallel to the recently invented digital
telegraph code by Samuel Morse was immediately
recognized by contemporaries who felt that if the
telegraph was able to establish contact invisibly
between two points on earth, it might be able to
do the same between two worlds, as well.10 It is
reported that on his deathbed Morse was aroused
from stupor by his physicians tapping on his chest,
calling him back from the netherworld.11 Already
by mid-1850s, Charles Partridge had established
his ”Spiritual Telegraph Office.“ In 1871, a certain
Mrs Hollis, a medium from Cincinnati, Ohio, clai-
med that the spirits had invented telegraphy in ad-
vance of its invention by Morse, suggesting that
”the time is not very distant when telegraphic
communication between the two worlds will be as
much established as it is now between Louisville
and Cincinatti (sic)“. The problem was that if the
spirits wanted to communicate through Morse
code, they needed to find amongst themselves a
deceased telegraph operator, as well as ”a band of
electricians to sustain the community spirit,“ and
to materialize a battery to power the telegraphic
machine.12 
During the first decades of modern spiritua-
lism, participants to séances were treated to spec-
tacular visual effects, such as dancing table, full-
figure materializations, ectoplasm oozing out of
the medium’s ears or nose. These strange events
were often captured on film. Among the most fa-
mous spiritualist photographs are those made in
1917 by Elsie Wright (aged 16) and her cousin
Frances Griffiths (aged 10) from Yorkshire. Using a
simple camera, they claimed to have taken pictu-
res of tiny winged fairies in their garden. Although
the fairies bear a remarkable resemblance to illust-
rations in a 1915 children’s book by Claude A.
Shepperson, true believers were overjoyed. Arthur
Conan Doyle not only accepted these photos as
genuine, he even wrote two pamphlets and a
book, The Coming of the Fairies, in their celebrati-
on. Yet, when sophisticated photographic equip-
ment became affordable to a large public, photos
were no longer able to sustain the ”necessary
blindness“ which according to Pierre Bourdieu is
required of successful ritual practice. 
Instead of visuality, the emphasis of the spiritu-
alists turned towards sound and in particular voice
effects. In this regard, the séances quicky followed
the near-simultaneous development of the tele-
phone and the phonograph in 1876–77. In 1877,
The Times explained the difference between the
telegraph and the telephone as follows: ”gushes,
sighs, tears, sallies of wit, and traits of fondness do
not stand the ordeal of twenty words for a shil-
ling.“13 The telegraph preserves the word, the
telephone transports the living, breathing, feeling
person. Analogously, the spiritualists took the ”di-
rect voice“ – the voice of the spirit emanating, as it
were, from a special ’trumpet‘ – as proof that the
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identity of a person persisted unchanged through
death. The ”direct voice“ was separated from the
medium who no longer actively interpreted the
signal (like a telegraph operator) but only passively
established or enabled a connection, much like a
telephone operator would.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century,
both communications technology and spiritualist
technique involved a move from somatic to tele-
matic processes of relay: the voice was disconnec-
ted from the body and its spatial location. The in-
vention of the phonograph introduced a temporal
dislocation as well: the voice can outlive the per-
son and thus guarantee a kind of individual im-
mortality in this world. Because of this, the phono-
graph was often associated with death. A case in
point is Francis Barraud’s famous painting His Mas-
ter’s Voice. It depicts the dog ‘Nipper‘ listening to
the horn with his ears cocked. Originally, the pic-
ture that Barrauld offered to The Gramophone
Company showed the dog sitting on the polished
surface of a coffin and listening not to a gramo-
phone but rather to a phonograph, which allows
(unlike an industrially manufactured gramophone
record) not only the playback but also the indivi-
dual recording of voices.14
Hannah and her sisters
The theory of the Human Condition is grounded on
a reality that is more easily verifiable than the
claims of the mediums: ancient Greece. With refe-
rence to Athens, she draws important distinctions
between labor, work and action.15 Labor relates to
the ’oikos‘ or household and responds to biologi-
cal necessities; necessity rules over all activities
performed in the household and the husband rules
over it by violence like a despot. Work relates to
the ’agora‘, and it is not natural; it is the sphere of
freedom. Action refers to speech between men
without the intermediary of things or matter; it
thrives on the plurality of men, the fact that each
individual is unique.16
Labor reproduces nature by providing nutrition
and sustenance for natural organisms while work
creates artefacts: a table, a house, or a law, for ex-
ample. Labor ensures the biological survival of the
species but from the individual’s point of view, the
products of labor are impermanent: they are ex-
hausted as they are consumed. In contrast, the
work of the ’homo faber‘ – e.g. the architect or the
legislator – fabricates a semi-permanent artificial
world of things which endures across time, pro-
vides spaces between individuals, gives people
identities by setting up the possibility for meaning-
ful speech and thus forges the people into a com-
munity.17 Arendt insists that the existence of a pu-
blic realm depends entirely on the permanence of
things that transcend the lifespan of mortal men.18
In setting up her categories of labor, work and ac-
tion, Arendt was of course aware of the inequality
of the sexes and social classes in ancient Athens.19
The arena for work, the political agora, was not
really accessible to women. Women were largely
limited to labor: giving birth as well as providing
food, clothing and other necessities of everyday
life.20 But even the house was divided according
to sex to ’andronitis‘, or the rooms for men, and
’gynaikonitis‘, or women’s spaces. To Antisthenes,
crossing the ’gynaikonitis‘ to the ’andronitis‘ was
like going from Athens to Sparta.21 The men’s side
was the place for symposia, to which the wives
and daughters had no access but hetairas were
often invited to entertain the men. Pseudo-
Demosthenes explains: ”We have courtesans for
pleasure ... and wives in order to have a legitimate
posterity and a faithful guardian of the hearth.“22
In classical Greece, love, whether homosexual or
heterosexual, happens outside of the home.23
Instead of love, the home or the house was the
space of identity and the foundation of citizenship.
Periclean law, though itself a product of ’homo fa-
ber‘, articulated two conditions for citizenship,
both of which relate exclusively to the biological
world of ’animal laborans‘. One condition was that
both of one’s parents must be native Athenians,
the other one that one had to be male. However,
without owning a house, a man could not partici-
pate in political discussion. Women did not have a
place of their own. Before marriage, a woman be-
longed to the hearth of her father, later to the
hearth of her husband. The requirement for a per-
manent place set up public space and excluded
women, foreigners and slaves from political discus-
sion.
In ancient Greek, there was no word for a fe-
male Athenian even though there was a word for a
male citizen.24 Women were not called by their
own names but addressed as the ”wife of“, ”daugh-
ter of“ or ”mother of“ a man. A husband could al-
so refer to his wife with the term gyne that transla-
tes as ”bearer of children“. Such conventions are
significant since according to ancient Greek beliefs
immortality was only possible through the survival
of the name. Lacking a name even at home, wo-
men were almost as deprived of freedom and visi-
bility in the city as slaves.25 Thus, access to the
public realm and the persistence of individual
identity were not for women in classical Athens.
Arendt notes that in Athens, ”women and
slaves belonged to the same category and were
hidden away not only because they were somebo-
dy else’s property but because their life was ’labo-
rious‘, devoted to bodily functions.“26 This is true
of women even today, as Sandra Harding insists:
women are assigned the work that men do not
want to do for themselves, especially the care of
everyone’s bodies – the bodies of men, babies,
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children, old people, the sick, and their own bo-
dies. And they are assigned responsibility for the
local places where those bodies exist as they clean
and care for their own and others’ houses and
work places.27 Yet it would be wrong to think that
Arendt advocates relegating women to the darkn-
ess of the megaron.28 As opposed to Mary O’Brien
who accuses Arendt of recapitulating Aristotelian
binary oppositions of men/society/public versus
women/nature/ private, Mary G. Dietz points out
that although ’animal laborans‘ is associated with
the feminine and ’homo faber‘ with the masculine,
neither one represents Arendt’s ideal condition,
the ’vita activa‘, which is ungendered.29
Space and speech
Similarly to the spiritualists, but referring to Aristo-
tle’s definitions of man, Arendt presents the facul-
ty of speech as constitutive of both personhood
and the polis. Thus, she stresses that Aristotle’s
definition of man as ’zoon politikon‘ should not be
translated as ’animal socialis‘ (a translation already
found in Seneca) but seen in conjunction with the
other Aristotelian definition, ’zoon logon ekhon‘
which does not exactly mean ’animal rationale‘ but
rather ”a living being capable of speech.“30 Other
Greek philosophers generally shared Aristotle’s
views. The Pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles,
for example, imagined the ancestors of men and
women as being human in form but lacking the
ability to speak, like infants: only the voice makes
the human being. A similar idea of speech as the
surest index of human identity can be found in Ben
Jonson’s Timber, or Discoveries Made upon Men
and Matter of 1640 with its famous lines: ”Langua-
ge most shews a man: Speak, that I may see thee,
for no glass renders a man’s form or likeness so
true as his speech“. The dictum is a variation of an
ancient Greek greeting. 
Arendt concludes that action as speech is ”the
exclusive prerogative of man; neither a beast nor a
god is capable of it, and only action is entirely de-
pendent upon the constant presence of others.“31
Action of this character requires a public space in
which it can be realized, a context in which indivi-
duals can encounter one another as members of a
community, since action would be meaningless
unless there were others present to see it. The
’agora‘ is for Arendt the ideal translation of politi-
cal speech into space.32 But is this model accurate
and is it still relevant today? 
The notion that the speech is the essence of
the political and thus the core of the agora as a
political space may not correctly describe the his-
torical development of Athens or any other an-
cient city. The origin of cities has more to do with
writing than with speech. According to Lewis
Mumford, ”It is no accident that the emergence of
the city as a self-contained unit ... coincided with
the development of the permanent record: with
glyphs, ideograms, and script, with the first ab-
stractions of number and verbal signs. By the time
this happened, the amount of culture to be trans-
mitted orally was beyond the capacity of a small
group to achieve even in a long lifetime.“33 Not
even in the agora in Athens was face-to-face con-
versation the only form of communication. Texts
and monuments reminded Athenian citizens of sig-
nificant events and occasionally even displayed
municipal laws and regulations. 
Yet, in Classical Greece, statues and tombs we-
re equipped with inscriptions which before 550 bc
were autodeictic, i.e. referring to themselves in the
first person.34 ”Here I am, the tomb of Krites“ is
what a ’sema‘ from the plain of Marathon decla-
res.35 Such inscriptions were written in phonetic
writing in what is known as ’scriptio continua‘,
without any marks as to where words begin or
end. This is true phonetic writing but it makes
difficult reading, unless one reads it aloud – but
silent reading was in any case unknown in Greece
at this time. If read aloud, the autodeictic inscripti-
on, which belongs properly to the statue, assumes
acoustic reality by the voice of the person reading
it. The statue, announcing its continuing life, takes
over the body of the passer-by uttering the words.
The deceased person lives through others every
time the text is read or, as it were, re-enacted.36
However, the autodeictic inscriptions of archaic
Greek funeral statues gradually lost their magical
power of evocation and re-presentation. In the
passage quoted above, Socrates continued to say
that written words were not really alive: ”you
might think they spoke as if they had intelligence,
but if you question them, they always say the one
and the same thing.“37 The text is removed from
the world that is alive in time. 
Indeed, writing (together with representational
art and architecture) allows for asynchronous acts
of communication: the speaker need not be pre-
sent when the reader deciphers the message. In
the nineteenth century, the invention of the tele-
graph and the telephone made possible a spatial
displacement of the speaker and the hearer, even
though the communication is synchronous. Even
earlier, the modern postal system achieved some-
thing that has been celebrated as the creation of
the Internet and other forms of electronic tele-
communication, namely a combination of both
kinds of displacements: the speaker and the hearer
need not be present in the same space nor at the
same time. Insofar as public space is understood as
a space of communication between various social
agents (that have enough shared values to make
the communication relevant), it is obvious that
public space is much influenced by the available
communicative media. John Stuart Mill made this
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point already in 1840. He believed that advances
in communications had made it possible to re-
create the political experience of Athenian demo-
cracy, since ”the newspapers and the railroads are
solving the problem of bringing the democracy of
England to vote, like that of Athens, simultaneous-
ly in one agora.“38 In this way, the actual modern
agora or the parliament and the symbolic agora or
the community of voters are unified. 
Further, it could be suggested that not only do
the conditions of communication change as tech-
nologies change but even the very identities of
those engaged in communication may be affected.
Notions of personhood, identity, individual free-
dom and privacy vary from society to society but
they often appear to be linked to social control, as
a kind of excess not covered by widely used sys-
tems of control: the true self is often experienced
as referring to that part of a person or behavior
which is conventionally not controlled. If this pos-
tulation is even remotely accurate, one may expect
that electronic surveillance systems should have an
effect on the very concept of a person and of pri-
vacy, and thus change the nature of the public
sphere as well.
The body politic meets the blob
In contemporary society, according to Arendt, the
ideals of ’homo faber‘ have been sacrificed to
those of the ’animal laborans‘; while the fabricator
of the world strove for permanence, stability and
durability, today the primary (if not the only) value
is abundance.39 Even material objects, such as
houses, furniture, or cars, that used to guarantee
supraindividual continuity are rapidly consumed
and replaced by others. Some years ago, Jean Bau-
drillard remarked that ”we are living the period of
the objects: that is, we live by their rhythm, accor-
ding to their incessant cycles. Today, it is we who
are observing their birth, fulfillment and death;
whereas in all previous civilizations, it was the ob-
ject, instrument, and perennial monument that
survived the generations of men.“40
Insofar as we agree with Arendt that the possi-
bility of communication, identity and politics is
contingent upon structures that predate and survi-
ve the individual, we can ask whether these struc-
tures should be material or not. She makes it clear
that to the ancient Greeks, laws were not results of
political action but the products of making, like
houses.41 This indicates that for Arendt, work need
not result in durable material things but it can also
take the form of long-lasting conventions. Recent
cybertheorists, such as Vilem Flusser, often insist
that everything material is ephemeral while only
non-material entities, that which Karl Popper called
World 3, can exist forever. From this point of view,
the disappearance of the physical agoras should
Thesis, Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, (2003) Heft 3
67
not complicate the political process too much.42
The permanence of material structures or social
conventions is, however, only one condition for
political action to unfold. Another one has to do
with Arendt’s distinction between the ”social“ ver-
sus the ”political“. In the Human Condition, Arendt
warned of the rise of the social as passive confor-
mism and the decline of the political as active citi-
zenship. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin compares Arendt’s
concept of the social to the fifties B-movie classic,
the Blob.43 In Pitkin’s reading, Arendt saw the so-
cial as an alien, all-consuming feminine monster
appearing as if from outer space to gobble up hu-
man freedom and causing public paralysis and de-
politicization. In this interpretation, Arendt’s ”so-
cial“ means a collectivity of people who conduct
themselves in such a way that they cannot control
or even intentionally influence the large-scale con-
sequences of their activities.
Arendt laments the disappearance of clear bor-
derlines between the political and social realms af-
ter antiquity, and argues that in the Middle Ages
all human relationships were modeled upon the
example of the household. A case in point are the
Medieval ’compagnons‘ that organized some pro-
fessional relationships: a ’compagnon‘ or ’compa-
nis‘ is a person with whom one shares bread, ’pa-
nis‘, at dinner.44 The dinner table has always been
recognized as an ideal setting for the forging of
social ties and communality. Sigmund Freud, for
example, compares the binding power of commu-
nal eating to kinship and maintains that kinship
signifies having part in a general substance. ”It is
natural then that it is based not only upon the fact
that we are a part of the substance of our mother
who has borne us, and whose milk nourished us,
but also that the food eaten later through which
the body is renewed, can acquire and strengthen
kinship.“45 For Arendt, the loaf of bread that one
shares with one’s companion seems to qualify as
an ”in-between“, for it organizes social relations-
hips. However, she explains that bread represents
labor and a table represents work and the world
because the table can last outlive a person.46 Ulti-
mately, communal eating only gives rise to the
social, never to the political. 
Pluralism
In talking about the political, Arendt emphasizes
plurality, non-conformism and free political debate
which raises the question of who is excluded. In
her opinion, there exist two common reactions to
the discriminatory practices of certain social surro-
undings: the parvenu and the pariah model.47 The
first one means that one adapts to the social, assi-
milates to the conformist ideal, and gives up one’s
own identity. The second model implies accepting
that one is marginalized and withdrawing to pri-
vacy as a ghetto. Arendt seems to advocate a third
alternative: neither to deny one’s own identity and
assimilate, nor to withdraw from political life but
instead to fight back defiantly by asserting one’s
own discriminated identity. 
The recent Renaissance of Arendt’s thinking es-
pecially among feminist writers has much to do
with the third option. However, it is difficult to see
how a discriminated identity can be maintained if
Arendt’s theory is accepted. From which foundati-
on do you fight back? If an individual is denied ac-
cess to a public sphere, and the public sphere is
the source of reality, then no sense of common,
shared reality can be acquired and thus the indivi-
dual’s psychological and social stability is undermi-
ned.
To move around this problem, Arendt’s con-
cepts of the world, language and community may
be questioned. Is there one public sphere or are
there several? How large is a community and what
constitutes it? In the beginning of the Human Con-
dition, Arendt urges the reader to distrust the poli-
tical judgment of scientists because they are forced
to use a language of mathematical symbols that is
not understandable to everyone. From this we can
see that for Arendt political action is premised on
a language that everyone can speak. Such a condi-
tion would entail, however, that no unified public
sphere could ever exist – a condition that could
also be seen as liberating. Political action breaks
into small communities, each constituted by a
shared language, and each recategorizing labor,
work and action in a particular way. The assertion
of a discriminated identity then happens at the
level of political communities, not individuals. An
identity that is contested in one sphere may be
well-grounded in another. What Arendt calls the
human condition of plurality – ”we are all the same,
that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever
the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or
will live“ – may apply not only to the community
but to the individual, as well.48 While ’animal la-
borans‘ and ’homo faber‘ implies a ”what“ (animal
or man), Arendt’s ideal condition of vita activa does
not designate an identity, but rather a context for
performing – or subverting – an identity, an active
”who speaks“.49 If this is correct, then the clear
division between public and private space breaks
down not only in the modern world, which Arendt
criticizes, but in classical Athens, as well. 
Still, the proliferation of contingent, performa-
tive identities is nowhere more evident than in the
recent emergence of cyberspace. In addition to the
parvenu, pariah, and rebel models of identity, cy-
berspace has opened up yet another possibility:
that of undisclosed or inauthentic identities. Inso-
far as a community is constituted through speech,
the Internet functions as an ”in-between“ and sets
up a communicative structure involving two or
more separate and yet linked parties. However, in
Arendt’s terms the Internet is a non-political com-
munity, rather like a marketplace, where there is
no decisive action and no separation between the
private and the public.50
For Arendt, a person must accept the responsi-
bility entailed by a disclosed identity in order to
gain the right to discuss political matters. This de-
mand is not unreasonable: social groupings can
give rise to terrifying inhumanity and violence if
the perpetrators do not have to accept individual
responsibility. Commenting upon the famous ex-
periments by Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbar-
do, Zygmunt Bauman has argued that cruelty is
social in origin. He concludes that responsibility
arises out of the proximity of the other: ”the moral
attribute of proximity is responsibility; the moral
attribute of social distance is lack of moral relati-
onship, or heterophobia.“51 Arendt implies as
much in her study of Adolf Eichmann and the ba-
nality of evil, and in her unpublished 1965 lectures
where she says that ”the greatest evil .... is com-
mitted by human beings who refuse to persons.“52
In Arendt’s original scheme, identity is the ba-
sis of political speech, action and humanity. She
insists that ”action and speech are so closely rela-
ted because the primordial and specifically human
act must at the same time contain the answer to
the question asked of every newcomer: ’Who are
you?‘“53 But in the feminist analysis, this question
does not admit of an essentialist answer. The me-
dium as an in-between construes contingent iden-
tities diacritically; even moral agents might be con-
tingent collectivities. 
Telepresence
Although cyberspace’s anonymity conflicts with
Arendt’s requirement of identification, it agrees
with her principles on another account: electronic
telepresence can be used to disengage communi-
cation from labor: the sweaty body of the ’animal
laborans‘ and the dusty bricks of ’homo faber’s‘
works are replaced by the lily-white disembodied
subjects of pure intelligence.54 In 1993, Michael
Heim enthused that when on-line, we break free
from bodily existence – our ”earthly, earthly exi-
stence“ – and emulate the viseo Dei, the perspec-
tive of God, the ”’all-at-onceness‘ of divine know-
ledge.“55
For the spiritualists, the cyber-believers and
Arendt, one of the consequences of modern tech-
nology is the alienation of man from earth and
earthliness. For her, the best symbol for this alie-
nation is the airplane, which epitomizes the shrin-
kage of the earth. Like many other writers from
Heinrich Heine through Filippo Marinetti to Paul
Virilio, Arendt declares that ”men now live in an
earth-wide continuous whole where even the noti-
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on of distance ... has yielded before the onslaught
of speed. Speed has conquered space...“56 As a
result of new communications technologies, tradi-
tional architectural boundaries have become obso-
lete. Insofar as a community is constituted by
communication, then it is reasonable to expect a
new social formation to emerge. 
In line with this reasoning, Vilem Flusser, Alvin
Toffler, Paul Virilio, Michael Benedikt and many
other futurist writers propose that traditional cities
are in the process of dissolution and about to be
substituted by electronic cottages.57 The visions of
the future range from Nicholas Negroponte’s de-
scription of digital technology as ”almost genetic
in nature“ and as ”natural force drawing people
into greater world harmony“ to John McHale’s and
William Gibson’s dreams of a cyberspace as the
sensuous paradise for cyborgs or completely dis-
embodied minds that exist eternally as information
in computer networks.58 In line with the Cartesian
dictum – ”I am not this assemblage of limbs called
the human body. ...I am, precisely speaking, only a
thing which thinks ...“59 – Earl Cox insisted that
”technology will soon enable human beings to
change into something else altogether“ and there-
by ”escape the human condition.“60 The expectati-
on that technology will bring deliverance from the
’soma sema‘, the prison of the body, is a recurring
dream. Indeed, already in 1929 J. D. Bernal pro-
phesized that ”scientists would emerge as a new
species and leave humanity behind.“ What these
”transformed men ... transcending the capacities of
untransformed humanity“ would leave behind
would be their bodies: they would become virtual-
ly immortal, experiencing a ”continuity of con-
sciousness“ in ”a practical eternity of existence.“61
Many writers, mostly women, have pointed out
that the visions of Gibson, Flusser and other cyber-
philosophers who talk about the dissolution of
space and the disappearance of the physical body
resemble the juvenile fantasies of teenage boys
who are uncomfortable with puberty or envious of
women’s ability to give birth.62
Be that as it may, a particularly aggressive neo-
liberalist version of the dissolution-of-space argu-
ment has been presented by Martin Pawley: he
calls for ”sand-heap urbanism“ or disurbanization
through telepresence. Echoing Ludwig Mies van
der Rohe, Pawley explains: ”Its public open space
is a vast and scaleless global network that is neit-
her metropolis nor wilderness but infinity: some-
thing that is willing itself into existence with a re-
morselessness untouched by human plan.“63 He
continues: ”It represents the ideal physical distri-
bution of humanity into insignificant, undifferen-
tiated, uniformly distributed particles without ur-
ban space, without urban identity, without
heritage, without history. ... It is the fate of archi-
tecture in this invisible global city to ephemerali-
ze.“64 It may seem that Pawley is merely accepting
the desires of large capitalist corporations as a law
of nature but in fact he promises a theoretical
argument, which he claims is derived from
Einstein’s theory of relativity, to back up this theo-
ry of disappearing space. In an astonishing passage,
he writes: ”Albert Einstein ... taught the world that
the connection between space and time is not
remote. Nor is it complicated, for it can be
demonstrated by the operation of an ordinary
camera. Under given conditions of light, time
values are inversely proportional to aperture values
in the exposure of film. The faster the shutter of
the camera moves, the larger the aperture required
to correctly expose the film, and vice versa. Apply-
ing the principle of the relativity of time and space
in a camera to time and space in a city produces a
useful theorem. If urban space is equated with
aperture size, and urban time with shutter speed,
the less space a city possesses, the more time it
has available. Conversely the more space it has,
the less time. If urban events were to become
instantaneous, as they would if continuous on-line
communications encompassed the world day and
night, then urban space might dwindle to nearly
nothing. There would be no need for urban space
as we understand it today.“65
Pawley’s understanding of physics may be
doubted but his millenarian pontification nonethe-
less appeals to many architects. The same could be
said of Virilio’s spirited but occasionally more dys-
topian writings. He predicts that the future elec-
tronic city will be characterized by domiciliary in-
ertia and behavioral isolation: people will stay
home alone, hooked on their computers, neglec-
ting any political action. Thus, while the modern
city with its motorized transportation prompted a
general mobilization of populations, the technopo-
lis with its instantaneous transmission prompts a
growing inertia and ultimately sepulchral immobi-
lity. 
With Virilio and Pawley from one direction and
with Arendt and the feminists from the other, we
seem to arrive at similar readings of the contem-
porary condition. It looks like information and
telecommunication technology is finally able to
bring about the revolution that the spiritualists
have been expecting since 1848: communication
in a non-material world, unbridled by physical and
temporal constraints, ”without the intermediary of
things or matter“, a bodiless immortality in which
human beings themselves become their own
works. Perhaps Jorge Luis Borges was right in sug-
gesting that universal history is the history of the
diverse intonation of a few metaphors.66
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